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F
or James Hathaway, the James E. and Sarah A. Degan
Professor of Law and the Director of the Program in
Refugee and Asylum Law at the University of Michi-
gan Law School, The Law of Refugee Status1 is a hard act to
follow. It has become the bible for those involved in the
interpretation of the Refugee Convention in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Published in 1988, it quickly became essen-
tial reading for refugee practitioners and members of refugee
tribunals. It has been routinely relied upon by courts around
the world in interpreting the definition of a Convention
refugee.
As a result, when I was asked to review Hathaway’s new
book, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, I
readily accepted. I was curious to see if Hathaway could
produce another treatise that might revolutionize thought
around such an important issue. At the same time I was
somewhat surprised that a refugee practitioner would be
chosen to review his new book. Practitioners are generally
grounded in domestic law. Our role as refugee lawyers is to
ensure that our clients are recognized as Convention refu-
gees by the relevant tribunals and to ensure that they are
afforded all the rights and protections available under do-
mestic law. As a Canadian lawyer grounded in domestic
law, I rely on Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act (IRPA)2 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Char-
ter)3 as the sources of my advocacy on behalf of my clients.
That being said, international law is becoming an increas-
ingly important part of my practice. It is an important tool
of interpretation when attempting to ascertain the meaning
of our Charter.4 For instance, the Supreme Court of Canada
in Suresh5 had recourse to international human rights law
in interpreting section 7 of the Charter and in determining
that removal to torture would in almost all cases violate the
principals of fundamental justice.
Despite these advances in the use of international law in
the domestic refugee context, practitioners are well aware
of the difficulty of ascertaining the scope of international
law in the everyday practice of refugee law. Courts have
been reluctant and cautious in using international law in
the immigration context.6 The applicability of international
law is uncertain, and its substance is subject to differing
interpretations by domestic courts.7 Moreover, interna-
tional human rights tribunals charged with protecting these
rights have no power to effectively enforce their decisions.8
It is with this background in mind that I approached
Hathaway’s treatise about refugee rights with caution.
Hathaway addresses this challenge head on in the first
chapter of his book, when he deals with the scope of inter-
national refugee law. He argues in favour of a conservative
approach to defining rights under refugee law. He suggests
that there are very few rights that are universally accepted
under international law—the right against discrimination
and the right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of life,
from torture, and from genocide. Given this limitation,
traditional customary international law therefore cannot be
a source for refugee rights. He maintains that the source for
rights of refugees under international law must be found
first in the Refugee Convention and then in the other inter-
national human rights treaties.9
He begins with the text of the Refugee Convention and
“seeks to understand it not on the basis of literal construc-
tions but rather in a way that takes real account of its
context, and which advances its objectives and its pur-
pose.”10 Hathaway believes that by grounding his evalu-
ation of refugee rights under international law in a
contextual analysis of the Refugee Convention, he can put
forward a more compelling argument for their acceptance
as principles of international law.
Having set out the framework for his analysis in chapter 1,
Hathaway begins his discussion of the rights of refugees in
chapter 2. He provides us with his definition for refugee
rights:
a mechanism by which to answer situation-specific vulnerabili-
ties that would otherwise deny refugees meaningful benefit of
the more general system of human rights protection.11
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Hathaway argues that the Refugee Convention provides for a
series of rights—the right to be able to escape, to be accepted,
to be provided shelter, to not be penalized for seeking refuge,
and to not be exposed to the risk of return; basic rights for
survival, for documentation, and for access to the courts;
rights of non-discrimination, religious freedom, and access
to the social safety net; and the right to work.12
After discussing the general terms of the Refugee Conven-
tion, Hathaway then considers whether or not any of the
other international human rights treaties have significantly
expanded the rights of refugees. He notes that although they
are extremely important documents in terms of their rec-
ognition of human rights, they do not add significantly to
the protection of refugees because they are directed mostly
toward persons who are citizens of states and they set out
the rights of citizens inside a country. International alien
law, as well, has not emerged to the point where there is any
generalized consensus that will assist refugees. As a result,
Hathaway concludes that when considering the rights of
refugees, the primary source must be the Refugee Conven-
tion itself.
In chapter 3 Hathaway provides us with an overall frame-
work for his analysis of the rights of refugees under inter-
national law. He argues that the Refugee Convention
recognizes a hierarchy of rights that depend on the degree
of connection that the refugee has to the country of asylum.
The most basic and fundamental rights, the rights to non-
discrimination and non-refoulement, attach as soon as a
refugee comes under a state’s jurisdiction, even prior to
arrival in the territory. Persons who actually arrive at the
territory acquire greater protection and those who are law-
fully admitted or who are accepted as long-term residents
would acquire the greatest rights.
In chapter 4 Hathaway considers the rights that a refugee
obtains immediately upon coming under the jurisdiction
of a state party. These rights may accrue even prior to arrival
on the territory of the state. The most important right is the
right to enter and remain in the country of asylum.
Hathaway acknowledges that there is no right of asylum,
and that there is no duty on a state to admit a refugee per se
but that the obligation only arises as a negative consequence
of the rule against refoulement. i.e. the right to enter a
country only accrues if the refusal to admit the person
might result in the Convention refugee being refouled back
to a country where he or she is at risk of persecution.
Hathaway makes several assertions in order to delineate
the scope of this right. First, the right to be protected against
refoulement arises only in the case of Convention refugees.
One consequence of this is that measures taken to prevent
refugees from leaving their country are not in breach of
Article 33 because a Convention refugee is defined as a
person who is outside his or her country of nationality. A
second consequence is that the duty to admit would only
arise when the denial of the right to admission would
expose the Convention refugee to a real risk of return to a
country where he or she would be subjected to persecution.
Hathaway makes the point that  the Convention applies
from the moment a person arrives in the state and applies
prior to the official recognition by the state. The character
of being a Convention refugee exists independently of na-
tional recognition and, therefore, the duty of non-refoule-
ment would apply to a refugee from the moment he or she
arrives in the state until such time as the determination is
made that he or she is not a refugee.
Hathaway reaches several conclusions based upon this
general analysis.  First, rules that prevent refugees from
arriving in countries of asylum, such as visa requirements
or interdiction at airports en route, are not inconsistent with
Article 33 because they do not immediately expose a person
to risk.  However, the Haitian interdictions by  the  U.S.
government are contrary to Article 33 because they exposed
Haitians to a real risk of persecution upon return to their
country due to the inadequacy of any determination that
was done on the high seas. Second, country of asylum rules
which deny a refugee admission to one country and require
him or her to make a claim in the first country of asylum
would not be inconsistent with Article 33 unless their ap-
plication exposes the refugee to a real risk of persecution,
i.e. a real risk of being returned to a country where he or
she would be subjected to persecution, or being exposed to
a determination of refugee status in a country where the
standards were not acceptable, either because of its inter-
pretation of the Convention refugee or of the quality of the
determination process.
At the end of this section, Hathaway maintains that a
strict interpretation of the right of entry, consistent with the
requirement of Article 33 of the Convention, is consistent
with international law. He rejects the notion that customary
international law has expanded the concept of refoulement
and suggests that those proponents who argue for an ex-
panded understanding of the rule against non-refoulement
are undermining the protection that is now available under
the Convention.
In the rest of chapter 4, Hathaway engages in analysis of
the other rights of a refugee upon arrival in a country of
asylum. He argues that the Convention imposes an obliga-
tion on a state to not arbitrarily detain or otherwise penalize
refugees who seek protection. This is subject, of course, to
the caveat that they must, according to Article 31, make
their presence known and seek protection at the earliest
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possible moment. Refugees are entitled to the basic neces-
sities of life, to protections of their life, and to their security
of the person; and they are entitled to receive adequate food
and shelter. They are entitled to respect for basic human
dignity, which includes the right to preservation of family
unity, freedom of thought, religion, and education. They
are also entitled to documentation and they should have
access to meaningful remedies. All of these rights flow from
the clear and express provisions of the Convention itself.
Hathaway argues that it is the Convention that gives refugees
these rights under international law.
In chapter 5, Hathaway examines the rights of refugees
who have been lawfully admitted to the country of asylum.
He argues that, as a  degree of attachment  between the
refugee and the state increases, so too do the rights that a
refugee may claim. He maintains that once a refugee is
lawfully in the country, he or she enjoys further rights,
including the right under Article 32 to substantive and
procedural protection against arbitrary expulsion. Refugees
are also entitled to freedom of internal movement within
the country. He notes that once a refugee is lawfully in the
country, Article 18 of the Convention gives the refugee a
right to self-employment. In chapter 6 Hathaway treats the
rights of refugees lawfully staying in the country. He argues
that once a refugee has been given the right to remain in the
country, he or she is entitled to work, to fair  working
conditions, to social security, to housing, and to other basic
rights, including the right of international travel.
Hathaway concludes by considering the difficult prob-
lem of enforcement of refugee rights. He notes that the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) does not have an enforcement role in its man-
date and contrasts this situation to that existing under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT) where
the Committees entrusted with supervising compliance do
have such a role. This deficiency makes enforcement of
refugee rights a greater challenge. However, having noted
this deficiency, Hathaway argues that the real problem is
the lack of any real commitment on the part of states to
comply with their obligations:
as the empirical evidence presented in this book tragically at-
tests, the reality today is that a significant number of states in all
parts of the world are withdrawing in practice from meeting
their legal duty.13
Given this reality, Hathaway argues that there is a need
to “design a structure for the implementation of Convention
rights that states will embrace,”14 one that does not merely
alleviate the burden on states, but one which also improves
the lot of refugees themselves. This is the challenge for those
involved in the debate around reforming the international
refugee system today.
Those who are looking to international law to provide an
expansive understanding of the rights of refugees may be
disappointed with Hathaway’s conservative approach. It is
Hathaway’s position that, given that states do not currently
meet their existing obligations under international law, it is
not a useful exercise to push the envelope further and try to
interpret the Convention in a manner that is not consistent
with the travaux or international jurisprudence. In my
view, given this reality that Hathway so clearly exposes, his
approach is a sensible one.
As a refugee lawyer my interest in Hathaway’s latest work
is not purely an academic one. By carefully delineating the
scope of the rights granted to refugees and ensuring that his
interpretation is in keeping with the Convention, the
travaux préparatoires, and the existing jurisprudence,
Hathaway has made a vital contribution. For those of us
practicing refugee law, Hathaway’s careful exposition of the
obligations that states have assumed under international
law will become a new standard to measure the conduct of
states in domestic courts. Only time will tell whether his
latest opus will become a new bestseller among refugee
scholars and legal practitioners. It is certainly safe to say that
Hathaway’s latest book is a major work that warrants care-
ful scrutiny.
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